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SOME SIGNIFICANT RECENT GEORGIA LEGISLATION
By F. HODGE O'NEAL*
and
JAMES C. QUARLES**

HE General Assembly of Georgia enacted a total of si i statutes
and passed 40 resolutions during the 1949 Regular Session. This
legislation covers more than 2,100 printed pages and ranges over
many and diverse subjects. Even a cursory discussion of the statutes
other than strictly local laws is impossible within the confines of a
single law review article. The discussion in this article is therefore
limited to four of the more significant statutes. The selection of these
four statutes was of necessity more or less arbitrary, but an attempt
was made to choose legislation of widespread and lasting interest to
practicing lawyers.'
The statutes selected for consideration relate to (i) registration
of voters, (2) unfair practices in sales of cigarettes, (3) contract
beneficiaries' right to sue, and (4) defamation by radio and television.
This article examines in detail each of these statutes and considers the
problems likely to arise under them. An attempt to evaluate legislation before it has been extensively applied in practice and to forecast
its judicial treatment by appellate courts is a presumptuous undertaking. The possibility that this article will be of some assistance to courts
and attorneys, however, justifies the venturing of opinions which
time and experience may modify.
(i)

Voters' Registration Act.

Act 297,2 the Voters' Registration Act, has probably created more
interest both in Georgia and in other states than has any other statute
enacted by the General Assembly during the 1949 session. It annulled
previously exisitng registrations of Georgia voters3 and established a
new procedure for their qualification and registration. Beginning in
I95O,' no person in Georgia will be eligible to vote in federal, state or
county elections' unless he has registered under the new act.
.Dean and Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University.
*Associate Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer Unive-sitv.
1. For a brief survey of other important legislation enacted during the 1949 sess on ser Kl!v and
Mottola, Acts and Resolutions of the 1949 General Assembly of Georgia, 11 GA. B. J. 432 (1949).
2. Ga. L. 1949, pp. 1204-1227.
3. Sec. 2, p. 1206.

4. Sec. 3, p. 1206.
5. Sec. 1, p. 1205. The Attorney General of Georgia has ruled that Act 297 does not affect vs"nT
for municipal offices and that municipalities do not have to establish new registration lists.
The Atlanta Journal, Apr. 13. 1949, p. 1, col. 8.
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The act provides that in each county with a population under
200,000, the Judge of the Superior Court shall appoint, from six
"upright and intelligent citizens" submitted to him by the grand jury,'
three registrars to serve for a term of four years;7 and that in each
county having a population over 200,ooo, the county tax collector or
the county tax commissioner and two deputies shall serve as registrars!
These county registrars are to determine the qualifications of voters,
register those qualifying, prepare lists of voters for use at elections,
and revise registration records from time to time by deleting the
names of persons disqualified?
Act 297 was purportedly enacted to implement provisions of the
Georgia Constitution of 1945 relating to voter qualification.1" The
Constitution, in addition to setting up citizenship, age, residence and
other typical prerequisites to voting," stipulates that an elector
must: (I) be of good character and "understand the duties and
obligations of citizenship under a republican form of government,"
or (2) be able to read and write in English any paragraph of the
United States or Georgia Constitutions."
A person desiring to register under Act 297 must apply to the
county registrars or to one of their deputies stationed in the office
of the tax collector or tax commissioner 3 and furnish information
showing that he meets citizenship, age and residence requirements.14
Further, the applicant must demonstrate his ability to read and write
by reading "intelligibly" and writing "legibly" a section of the state
or federal constitution selected by the official registering him.' 5 If the
applicant meets the requirements as to citizenship, age and residence,
swears that he has not committed a serious crime, and proves that he
is able to read and write, his name is placed on the list of qualified
voters.
If an applicant cannot read and write but otherwise satisfies the
6. See. 6, pp. 1206-1207.
7. The first registrars will serve a five-year term ending in 1953. Sec. 6, pp. 1206-1207.

8. Sec. 7, p. 1207.

9. Secs. 10-38, pp. 1208-1223; sees. 45-46, p. 1225; secs. 52-54, pp. 1226-1227.
10. See sec. 55, p. 1227.
11. To qualify to vote in Georgia, a person must be a citizen of the United States and eighteen
years of age (GA. CONST. Art. II, sec. 1, para. 2); must have resided for one year in Georgia
and for six months in the county in which he offers to vote (GA. CONST. Art. II, sec. 1, para. 3);
must not be an idiot or insane and must not have been convicted of certain crimes (GA. CONST.
Art. II, sec. 2, para. 1).

12. GA. CONST. Art. II, sec. 1, para. 4. Persons whose inability to read and write results solely
from physical disability qualify if they "can understand and give a reasonable interpretation of
any paragraph of the Constitution of the United States or of this State that may be read to
them." ibid.

13. At least one county has established "branch offices" for registration. The Atlanta Journal,
July 6, 1949, p. 17, col. 5. No mention of "branch offices" is made in Act 297. Section 15, pp.

1209-1210, of that Act reads: "Any person desiring to be registered and qualify as a voter
shall apply to the registrars, or to the deputy stationed in the office of the tax collector or tax
commissioner."
14. See. 11, p. 1208; sec. 15, pp. 1209-1210.
15. Sec. 17, p. 1210. "In all cases where it appears that the applicant solely because of physical

disability is unable to read, the section shall be read to him by the official and he shall be called
upon to give a reasonable interpreation of it." ibid.
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voting requirements, he can qualify by appearing before the full
county board of registrars and showing that he is of good moral
character and "understands the duties and obligations of citizenship
under a republican form of government."' 6 To determine whether
an applicant understands the duties of citizenship, the board gives
him an examination composed of thirty simple questions about the
federal and state governments, the questions being specifically set out
in a section of the act itself. 7 To qualify, the applicant must answer
correctly ten of the thirty questions.18
Once an elector has qualified, he will retain the right to vote without the necessity of re-registration so long as he votes regularly. 9
On the other hand, if he does not vote in at least one election in any
two-year period, his registration will be canceled unless he files a statement specifically requesting its continuation." Even if a voter's registration is canceled, he may reregister by going through the full registration procedure. 2 '
Two cases raising the constitutionality of Act 297 are now pending
before the Supreme Court of Georgia, and probably the validity of
the act will also be challenged in the federal courts. The act, however,
appears to be consistent with both the state and federal constitutions.
The Georgia constitution authorizes the General Assembly to provide,
"from time to time, for the registration of all electors,"' 2 and Act 297
merely implements provisions of the Georgia Constitution relating to
voter qualifications.
The cost of registration under Act 297, which is considerable, is
borne by the various counties.23 Some county officials have manifested
dissatisfaction because the burden was placed on the counties and have
16. Sec. 17, p. 1210; sees. 20-22, pp. 1211-1213.
17. The questions are: (1) Who is President of the United States? (2) What is the term of office of
the President of the United States? (3) May the President of the United States be legally
elected for a second term? (4) If the President of the United States dies in office, who succeeds
How many
him? (5)
How many groups compose the Congress of the United States? (6)
United States Senators are there from Georgia? (7) What is the term of office of a United States
Who is Governor of
Senator? (8) Who are the United States Senators from Georgia? (9)
Who is Chief Justice of the SuGeorgia? (10) Who is Lieutenant Governor of Georgia? (11)
preme Court of Georgia? (12) Who is Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of Georgia? (13)
Does each Georgia
Into what two groups is the General Assembly of Georgia divided? (14)
County have at least one representative in the Georgia House of Representatives? (15) Do all
the
Georgia
House
of RepresentGeorgia counties have the same number of representatives in
atives? (16) In what city are the laws of the United States made? (17) How old do you have to be
to vote in Georgia? (18) What city is the capital of the United States? (19) How many states are
there in the United States? (20) Who is Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army? (21)
In what Congressional District do you live? (22) Who represents your Congressional District in
the National House of Representatives? (23) In what State Senatorial District do you live? (24)
Who is the State Senator that represents your Senatorial District? (25) In what county do you
live? (26) Who represents your County in the House of Representatives of Georgia? If there
are more than one representative, name them. (27) What is the name of the County seat of
your County? (28) Who is the Ordinary of your County? (29) Who is the Judge of the Superior
Court of your circuit? If there are more than one, name one additional Judge. (30) Who is
the Solicitor-General of your circuit? See. 22, pp. 1213-1217.
18. Sec. 21, pp. 1212-1213.
19. Sec. 23, pp. 1217-1218.
20. ibid.
21. ibid.
22. GA. CONST. Art. II, sec. 2, para. 1.
23. Sec. 47, p. 1225.
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questioned the constitutional authority of the General Assembly to
impose the expense on the counties. The Supreme Court of Georgia,
however, has clearly indicated that a constitutional provision granting
the General Assembly authority to provide from time to time for the
registration of electors, empowers it to impose on the counties the
duty to discharge the expenses of county registrars.24
Greater doubt can reasonably exist as to whether Act 297 contravenes the Federal Constitution. The present Governor of Georgia,
during his campaign, frequently advocated a re-registration of the
electorate, as he said, to prevent "bloc voting";2 and the general
understanding was that he would sponsor legislation designed to
eliminate Negro voters.2" Act 297 was usually assumed to have been
drafted to accomplish that end and at the same time to avoid the
vices which led to the annulment by the United States Supreme Court
of previous Southern legislation barring Negroes from the polls. Proponents of Act 297 in the General Assembly, however, never conceded that it was designed to disfranchise Negroes, and, in actual
operation it apparently has not resulted in discrimination.27
The Constitution of the United States does not affirmatively confer
the right to vote on citizens of the United States or on citizens of the
individual states. 2' The only suffrage provision in the constitution is
that electors .of Representatives and Senators in Congress shall have
the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch
of the state legislature."' In most respects, a state is free to conduct
its elections and to limit its electorate as it deems proper." The federal courts, however, will step in when a state, in prescribing the
qualifications for voters, contravenes the Fourteenth, Fifteenth or
Nineteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution.' The Nineteenth Amendment relates to the denial of the right to vote on the
basis of sex, and Act 297 clearly does not disqualify persons on that
basis. The Fifteenth Amendment provides: "The right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude." Finally, the equal protection clause of the
24. Howell v. Bankston, 181 Ga. 59, 181 S. E. 761 (1935) (decided while Georgia Constitution of
1877 was in effect); cf. Leverette v. Leonard, 192 Ga. 359, 15 S. E. 2d 421 (1941).
25. See The Atlanta Journal, Apr. 10, 1949, p. 2-A, cols. 3-4; July 6, 1949, p. 19, cols. 1-2.
26. The Attorney General of Georgia hai been quoted as saying: "The new registration law is a
legal monstrosity which disfranchised 1,200,000 people upon the stroke of a pen. Its life depends upon the financial status of 159 counties which are already bankrupt. It invites a
multiplicity of lawsuits, and will reactivate race hatred. Its motive was evil per se." The Atlanta Journal, July 6, 1949, p. 19, cols. 1-4.
27. See The Atlanta Journal, July 10, 1949, p. 1-D, col. 6, reporting that a survey of over half of
the Georgia counties failed to disclose ev~dence of discrimination against Negroes.
28. ROTTSCHAEFER, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 750-754. see. 311 (1989).
29. U. S. CONST. Art. I, see. 2, cl.1; U. S. CONST. AMEND.

XVII, sec. 1

30. Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621, 24 S. Ct. 573, 48 L. Ed. 817 (1904).
31. See Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872, 876 (S.D. Ala. 1949) and authorities cited.
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Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to forbid suffrage
restrictions based on race or color. :2
Whether Act 297 violates the Federal Constitution depends upon
whether the act in reality operates to bar Negroes because of their
color or race. 3 As has been indicated previously, an applicant is permitted to vote by Act 297 if he can ( i ) read and write a section of the
federal or state constitution; or, in the alternative (2) answer correctly ten out of thirty simple civics questions. The first method of
qualification is obviously nothing more than a literacy test, and the
power of a state to prescribe a literacy test for electors has long been
recognized. 4 Of course a literacy test will actually exclude at the
present time a larger proportion of Negroes than of whites; but the
exclusion is not based on race or color. Further, a literacy test is a
desirable method of selecting voters, particularly ifa large part of
the population is lacking in the habits and traditions of political independence. To enfranchise at the present time all Negroes in Georgia would be to add to the electorate many persons unfitted for participation in government. The Negroes themselves would suffer from
the corrupt and inefficient governments which would almost inevitably
develop. Plantation owners and other landlords for years to come
could wield control over the votes of Negro tenants, and demagogues
could dominate the Negro masses in the urban communities. On the
other hand, Negroes as they become qualified to vote intelligently can
easily pass the literacy test and thus become voters." Of course, unless
the literacy test is applied impartially to whites and Negroes alike,
the administration of the test, as distinguished from the test itself,
will be subject to successful constitutional attack. And furthermore,
a literacy test, even though constitutional in the abstract, might be
declared invalid on the ground that a state so restricts the educational
opportunities of Negroes that as a practical matter it prevents their
acquiring the ability to read and write and thus to qualify as electors.
The alternative method of qualification, for use by those who wish
to register but cannot read or write, probably is not adapted to the
obtaining of an intelligent electorate or one well informed on public
affairs. With a little instruction, anyone should be able to answer ten
of the thirty questions; and even if an applicant fails, the practice
32. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 47 S. Ct. 446, 71 L. Ed. 759 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286
U. S. 73, 52 S. Ct. 484, 76 L. Ed. 984, 88 A.L.R. 458 (1932); cf. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S.
649, 64 S. Ct. 757, 88 L. Ed. 987, 151 A.L.R. 1110 (1944).
33. "The Amendment (i.e., the 15th) nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of
discrimination. It hits onerous procedural requirements which effectively handicap exercise of the
franchise by the colored race although the abstract right to vote may remain unrestricted as to
race." Frankfurter, J., in Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268, 275, 59 S. Ct. 872, 876, 83 L. Ed.
1281, 1287 (1939):
34. Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, 35 S. Ct. 926, 59 L. Ed. 1340, L.R.A. 1916A, 1124 (1914).
35. In all probability, the gradual addition of Negroes to the electorate as they become literate would
not arouse the same opposition among the white population as would the immediate voting of
large numbers of uneducated and politically incompetent Negroes.
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throughout the state seems to be to permit him to undergo further
coaching and try the test again." Certainly the "machine" politicians
and "courthouse crowds" will have no difficulty qualifying their supporters. Nevertheless, this method of qualification does not appear
to be contrary to the Federal Constitution. The act does not leave
a discretion in the registrars to facilitate discrimination against
Negroes. Identical questions are asked all persons seeking to qualify
by this method; each question has a single answer, composed of one
or two words; and the answers are not of a type to require subjective
evaluation. 7 Further, the registrars must make a record, listing for
each question the correct answer and the answer given by the applicant.
Attorneys for the National Association for Advancement of Colored People are reported" to have tentatively concluded that Act 297
will be held unconstitutional on the same grounds that led to the
avoidance of the Boswell Amendment to the Constitution of Alabama. 9 An examination of Act 297, however, fails to reveal the
defects which led to the striking down of the Boswell Amendment.
The latter amendment provided that a person could not qualify as an
elector in Alabama unless he could "understand" and "explain" any
article of the Constitution of the United States. In Davis v. Schnell,4"
a Negro citizen of Alabama brought suit before a three judge Federal
District Court for a declaratory judgment that the amendment was
unconstitutional. The court felt that, since the amendment provided
no uniform, objective, standardized test to control the judgment of
the registrars, they had arbitrary power to accept or reject any prospective elector, and that, since this power was being exercised to exclude Negroes, the amendment denied the equal protection of the law
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. The court seemed to be much
influenced by a conviction that the amendment was designed to restrict voting on the basis of race or color and that as a rule only
Negroes were required to submit to the tests established by it.4 The
conclusion reached was that the amendment was unconstitutional
"both in its object and the manner of its administration." On appeal
the decision of the District Court was affirmed in a memorandum decision by the Supreme Court of the United States. 2
36. "If any one, white or Negro. asks for a copy of the test questions to take home and study, he
is given one. If he fails the test once, he can come back and try again." The Atlanta Journal,
July 10, 1949. p. 12-D, col. 4.
37. In annulling the Boswell Amendment to the Alabama Constitution, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Alabama said in Davis v. Schnell. 81 F. Supp. 872, 878 (1949):
"A simple test may be given one applicant; a long, tedious, complex one to another; one applicant may be examined on one article of the Constitution; another may be called upon to
'understand and explain' every article and provision of the entire instrument."
38. The Atlanta Journal, Apr. 10, 1949, p. 2-A, cols. 3-4.
39. ALA. CONST. AMEND. LV (1901).
40. 81 F. Supp. 872 (S. D. Ala. 1949).
41. id. at 878-880.
42. 336 U. S. 933, 69 S. Ct. 749 (1949).
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The significant differences between the Boswell Amendment and
Act 297 should be noted. 3 First, the Boswell Amendment provided no
discernible standard to limit the discretion of the registrars in determining the eligibility of prospective voters; on the other hand, each
of the methods of qualification set up by Act 297 is implemented by
objective tests. Second, the history of the origin and adoption of the
Boswell Amendment clearly showed that it was designed to restrict
voting on the basis of color; it has never been established that the
purpose of Act 297 was to bar Negroes from the polls. Third, under
the Boswell Amendment, the registrars as a rule required prospective
Negro voters to attempt to interpret some section of the constitution, but no such requirement was exacted of white applicants; apparently the tests established by Act 297 have thus far been applied
impartially to both Whites and Negroes." Finally, under the Boswell
Amendment, no record could be made which would give a rejected
applicant a definite basis on which to obtain judicial review of the
registrars' action; under Act 297, the registration card is marked
to indicate whether the applicant can read and write;" and, if he
cannot read and write but applies for qualification by reason of his
good character and his understanding of the duties of citizenship, the
registrars are required to keep a record of the questions asked and
the answers given and to file this record with the registration card."
A third method of qualifying to vote under Act 297 applies to a
very limited number of people. A person unable to read and write
solely because of physical disability can qualify as an elector by giving
a "reasonable" interpretation of a constitutional provision. Although no definite standard is laid down to govern the discretion of
the registrars in passing on the qualifications of the disabled persons,
manifestly this method of qualification was not designed to discriminate against Negroes and should not be held to be in contravention
of either the Fifteenth Amendment or the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
In conclusion, the point should be made that legislation which is
constitutionally sound can be unconstitutionally administered. The
power of the state is just as clearly being exercised in violation of the
Federal Constitution if an act is administered to exclude Negroes
43. The distinction should also be noted between Act 297 and the state constitutional provision under
consideration in Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, 35 S. Ct. 926, 59 L. Ed. 1340, L.R.A.
1916A. 1124 (1914). The latter denied the right to vote to those who could not read and write
but excepted those'who on January 1, 1866, or prior thereto had the right to vote, or who at
that time resided in a foreign country, or who were lineal descendants of the foregoing excepted
persons. The United States Supreme Court held the provision to be an indirect attempt to deny
the right to vote on account of race or color and directed that Negroes who could not pass
the prescribed test be permitted to vote in spite of that failure.
44. See The Atlanta Journal, July 10, 1949, p. 12-D, col. 4.
45. Sec. 11, pp. 1208-1209; sec. 17, p. 1210.
46. Sec. 21, pp. 1212-121S.
47. Sec. 17, p. 1210.
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from the polls because of their color as if the act itself excludes persons on account of color."
(2)

Unfair Cigarette Sales Act

Act 162," the Unfair Cigarette Sales Act, is a detailed and comprehensive statute designed primarily to prevent unfair and destructive practices in the wholesale and retail sale of cigarettes. It seeks
to achieve this end by forbidding wholesale and retail dealers to sell
cigarettes for less than "cost," i.e. the cost of the cigarettes plus the
cost of doing business. In brief outline, the Act definies the "cost" to
a wholesaler or retailer as the "basic cost of cigarettes" plus the
cost of doing business "as evidenced by the standards and methods of
accounting regularly employed in the allocation of overhead costs
and expenses, paid or incurred.""0 Certain costs are specifically required to be included." The "basic cost of cigarettes" is defined to
be the invoice cost or the replacement cost in the quantity last purchased within thirty days prior to the date of sale, whichever is lower,
less all trade discounts and customary discounts for cash, plus the face
value of cigarette tax stamps if not already included by the manufacturer in his list price.5" In the absence of proof of a different cost of
doing business, the retailer's cost of doing business is presumed to
be eight per cent of the basic cost of cigarettes to him ;5 3 the wholesaler's is presumed to be four and one-half per cent of his basic cost
of cigarettes plus cartage to the retail outlet if he performs or pays
for this service, this cartage cost being deemed to be one-half of one
per cent of the basic cost of cigarettes to him unless a different cost is
4
proved."
Any wholesaler or retailer selling at less than the cost to him with
the intent "to injure competitors or destroy or substantially lessen
competition" is guilty of a misdemeanor.5 A party who has been injured by any violation of the Act, or who would suffer injury from
any threatened violation, may seek damages or injunctive relief, or
both." In addition, injunctive relief may be sought by the State Revenue Commissioner. 7
48. Rice v. Elmore, 165 F. 2d 387 (C.C.A. 4th 1947). cert. denied, 333 U. S. 875, 68 S. Ct. 905,
92 L. Ed. 1151 (1948); cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220
(1886).
49. Ga. L. 1949, p. 695-702.
50. Sec. 2j(1), p. 697; see. 2k (1), p. 698.
51, ". .. labor costs (including salaries of executives and officers), rent, depreciation, selling costs.
maintenance of equipment, delivery costs, all types of licenses, taxes, insurance and advertising."
Sec. 2j(1), p. 697; sec. 2k(1), p. 698.

52. Sec. 2i, p. 697.
53. Sec. 2k(2). p. 698.
54. Sec. 2j(2). pp. 697-698.

55. Sec. 3, p. 698.
56. Sec. 1a, p. 701.
57. ibid.
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The Act does not apply to certain types of sales. Thus, a retailer
may sell at a price made in good faith to meet the price of a competitor who is selling at cost defined by the Act, and a wholesaler is
given the same privilege if the competing wholesaler is rendering the
same type of service." Good faith clearance sales, sales of imperfect
or damaged cigarettes, sales in connection with the final liquidation
of a.business, and sales under court order are excepted from the provisions of the act,"0 and sales of this type may not be considered in
determining
the cost of cigarettes to a competitor whose price one may
60
meet.

The Unfgir Cigarette Sales Act apparently was passed to fill a
need not satisfied by the Georgia Fair Trade Act. 6 The Fair Trade
Act applies to commodities bearing the trademark, brand or name of
the producer or distributor when these commodities are in free and
open competition with similar commodities produced or distributed
by others. It gives approval to contracts under which the seller sets
the minimum resale price of such commodities (i.e., "vertical" pricesetting is permitted: "horizontal" price-setting contracts are expressly excluded 2 ) and provides that violation of such contracts is
unfair competition and actionable at the suit of any person damaged."3
The chief differences between the Fair Trade Act and the Unfair
Cigarette Sales Act are: (i) the former applies to all commodities
carrying with them identification of the producer or distributor;
the latter applies only to cigarettes; (2) prices under the former are
governed by contract between the parties dealing in the commodities;
prices under the latter are based on the price paid for the cigarettes
plus the cost of doing business; (3) the former gives to the injured.
party an action for damages; the latter in addition provides for injunctive relief and criminal sanctions.
Statutes in some way regulating the price for which a merchant
may sell his goods have been enacted in almost every state, and
usually have been upheld. Numerous decisions have construed these.
statutes. 4 Because of the variations in the statutes and in the economic attitudes of courts deciding cases arising under them, those
cases do not afford a clear guide for predicting judicial treatment of
the Georgia statute. The best approach may be to consider some of
the cases invalidating parts or all of other trade pr.actices statutes and
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Sec. 7a, p. 700.
Sec. 6. p. 699.
Sec. 7a, p. 700.
GA. CODE ANN. secs. 106-401 et seq. (Supp. 1947). Act No. 100, Ga. L. 1937, pp. 800 et seq.
"This Chapter shall not apply to any contract or agreement between or among producers or
distributors or between or among wholesalers or between or among retailers as to sale or resale
prices." GA. CODE ANN. secs. 106-408 (Supp. 1947). Ga. L. 1937, pp. 800, 803.
63. GA. CODE ANN. secs. 106-407 (Supo. 1947), Ga. L. 1937, pp. 800, 803.
64. For collections of cases, see Notes, 128 A.L.R. 1126 (1940); 118 A.L.R. 506 (1939).
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to determine as nearly as practicable whether the Georgia statute has
provisions similar to those which have been declared invalid.65
Probably the greatest number of courts have found trade practices
statutes invalid on the ground that their provisions were too vague
and uncertain. Courts have found too indefinite, for example, statutory provisions directed against sales not justified by "existing market conditions." 6 Uncertainty as to how a seller can determine a
competitor's "legal price for merchandise of the same grade, quantity
and quality" has also been found.67 The "cost survey" provision in
8 was found too vague and
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Ervin"
indefinite. An industry-established cost survey for the alleged offender's locality was made competent evidence to prove his costs.
When the cost survey "established a fair and reasonable average cost
of doing business for that trade or industry," the average cost was
prima facie evidence of costs of all members in that locality. A federal court felt that the statute was faulty in that it failed to define
"cost survey," was ambiguous as to whether the survey was admissible if not fair, and did not show how extensive an area the survey
must cover.
The Georgia statute does not require prices to be justified by
"existing market provisions." Its provisions in regard to cost surveys
are more concrete than those considered in Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. Ervin.69 The Georgia Act gives the State Revenue Commissioner power to make or have made cost surveys for the State or
for trading areas defined by him; and a survey, to be used under the
Act, must be made by or approved by him. ° Further, the cost survey
must be made "pursuant to recognized statistical and cost accounting
practices."' It is competent evidence in proceedings under the Act to
prove costs, but the party against whom it is admitted may offer evidence to prove inaccuracies in it or to establish a state of facts which
would impair its probative value.72 The lowest cost to sellers as determined by such a survey is also presumed to be the actual cost of a
competitor under section 7 of the Act.73
65. In Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corporation, 40 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949), the
Florida Supreme Court by its own admission went against the current of authority in holding
unconstitutional a statute quite similar to the Georgia Fair Trade Act. The court, in writing
three opinions concurred in by a majority of its members, was impressed with the view that
such statutes were passed in times of overproduction, and felt their application in times of a
"seller's market" would be beyond the state's police power.

66. See State v. Walgreen Drug Co., 57 Ariz. 308, 113 P. 2d 650 (1941); Daniel Loughran Co. v.
Lord Baltimore Candy & Tobacco Co., 178 Md. 38, 12 A. 2d 201 (1940); State v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., 123 N. J. L. 180, 8 A. 2d 291 (1939); Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A.
2d 67, 128 A.L.R. 1120 (1940).
67. See State v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., 123 N. J. L. 180, 8 A. 2d 291, 295 (1939); Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A. 2d 67, 71, 128 A.L.R. 1120 (1940).
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

23 F. Supp. 70 (D. Minn. 1938).
ibid.
Sec. 12, p. 702.
See. 9b, p. 701.
ibid.
See supra, p. 35.
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A few courts have felt that price cutting is not in itself an evil, and
therefore a statute punishing a merchant for selling goods below cost
or even giving them away is arbitrary unless subjection to the penalty
is dependent upon an improper purpose or intention.74 The Georgia
statute is not open to this objection, since it makes sales below cost
unlawful only if made "with intent to injure competitors or destroy
or substantially lessen competition.""
8 the court found
In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Ervin,"
many defects in the Minnesota statute (which was later amended,
and, as amended, upheld by the state court 77). The court struck down
the provisions requiring a merchant to accept as the actual cost of his
goods the prices shown on the manufacturer's price list less published
discounts, whether or not they represented the merchant's actual
cost, and requiring prices to be based upon selling costs of the preceding calendar year, even though the cost may have declined; the
court, however, said that making such factors prima facie evidence
of actual cost and selling costs would have been permissible. Neither
of these objectionable provisions is present in the Georgia statute. As
has been indicated, 8 the cost of cigarettes to the seller is based upon
the invoice or replacement cost, whichever is lower, and the seller's
cost of doing business may be shown by "the standards and methods
of accounting regularly employed by him in his allocation of overhead
costs and expenses," 9 the presumption as to the cost of doing business being made only "in the absence of proof of a lesser or higher
cost of doing business." 8
Provisions in trade practices statutes creating presumptions of
wrongful intent have met varying though perhaps not inconsistent
judicial reactions. The Georgia Act provides: "Evidence of advertisement, offering to sell, or sale of cigarettes by any retailer or
wholesaler at less than cost to him as defined by this Act shall be
prima facie evidence of intent to injure competitors, and to destroy
or substantially lessen competition." 8 A Minnesota statutory presumption that one who made a sale at less than io% of the manufacturer's
list price less published discounts was not only making a sale at below
cost, but also intended to injure competitors and destroy competi74. Daniel Loughran Co. v. Lord Baltimore Candy & Tobacco Co., 178 Md. 38, 12 A. 2d 201 (1940);
State v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., 123 N. J. L. 180, 8 A. 2d 291 (1939); Commonwealth v.
Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A. 2d 67, 128 A.L.R. 1120 (1940). But see McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn.
580, 292 N. W. 414, 417 (1940): "The present statute prohibits sales at less than cost for the
purpose or with the effect of injuring competitors or destroying competition. Intent to injure is
not essential to violation. This is not fatal to the act."

75. Sec. 3a, p. 698.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

23 F. Supp. 70 (D. Minn. 1938).
See MeElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 292 N. W. 414 (1940).
Supra, p. 34.
Sees. 2j(1). p. 697, 2k (1), p. 698.
Secs. 2j(2), p. 697, 2k(2), p. 698.

81. Sec. 3b, p. 699.
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tion, was found unconstitutional in that it subjected the accused to
unreasonable hardship and oppression." On the other hand, a provision in a California statute that proof of one or more sales below
cost, plus proof of the injurious effects of such acts, "shall be presumptive evidence of the purpose or intent to injure competitors or
destroy competition" was upheld.83 The California court distinguished
between the two provisions on the ground that the Minnesota presumption did not permit consideration of the actual cost or the effect
of a seller's activities. The Georgia statute falls between these two
statutes, in that a defendant may show his actual cost, but the presumption arises without a showing of injurious effect.
Discrimination between different types of sellers has been sufficient
to invalidate parts of trade practices statutes. Thus, it was found that
a provision in effect making illegal, honest differences in sales costs
at different stores owned by the same merchant, arbitrarily and unfairly discriminated between merchants owning one store in one locality
and merchants owning more than one store and doing business in
more than one locality.84 A provision having the effect of fixing the
same cost for "cash and carry" wholesalers as for "service" wholesalers, the former performing fewer services for their customers and
naturally being able to operate more inexpensively than a wholesaler
who hired salesman, made deliveries and extended credit, has likewise been declared invalid. 5 The Georgia statute apparently does not
have the vice of either of the above statutes. There is no express provision preventing sales by a merchant in one part of the state at a
price lower than those charged by him at a different locality, if different costs are established by his accounting methods.
The plan of the statute seems sufficiently elastic to take care of
whatever differences may exist between dealers of different types. The
presumption of a percentage cost of doing business applies only in
the absence of proof of a lesser or higher cost of doing business,86
and the possibility of differences in regard to supplying cartage service
is expressly recognized." The courts may be confronted by factual
situations in which enforcement of the statute will be unfair to particular groups or individuals, depending upon how the business involved is operated, but such possibilities must await the future.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70 (D. Minn. 1938).
People v. Pay Less Drug Store, 25 Cal. 2d 108, 153 P. 2d 9 (1944).
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Ervin. 23 F. Supp. 70 (D. Minn. 1938).
See Serrer v. Cigarette Service Co., 74 N. E. 2d 853, 858 (Ohio App. 1947), aff'd, Serrer v.
Cigarette Service Co., 76 N. E. 2d 91 (Ohio 1947). In this case, the Ohio Court of Appeals said
the statute in having this effect "also tends to fix uniform wholesale prices for cigarettes in
Ohio and accordingly does not have 'a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be

attained' namely, the fostering of free, open and fair competition in the wholesale marketing
of cigarettes." See also, Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corporation, 40 So. 2d 871.
385 (Fla. 1949).
86. Sec. 2j(2), p. 697; sec. 2k(2), p. 698.
87. Sec. 2j(2), p. 697.

1949]

SOME RECENT GEORGIA LEGISLATION

It may be noted, finally, that the application of a statute of this
type to the single commodity of cigarettes has been found not to
contravene constitutional requirements of uniformity and equal protection."8
(3) A Contract Beneficiary's Right to Sue.
Act I22"o effected important changes in the Georgia law on third
party beneficiaries. That act amended Section 3-108 of the Georgia
Code of 1933 by adding a stipulation that a "beneficiary of a contract made between other parties for his benefit may maintain an
action against the promisor on said contract." Prior to amendment
Section 3-108 provided:

"As a general rule, the action on a contract, whether express
or implied, or whether by parol or under seal, or of record, shall
be brought in the name of the party in whom the legal interest in
such contract is vested, and against the party who made it in person or by agent."

Section 3-io8, as it read before amendment, first became a part of the
statute law of Georgia in I863"' and appeared totidem verbis in
each Georgia Code subsequent to that date."'
To evaluate Act 122 and to predict with reasonable accuracy its
effect on legal principles previously prevailing in Georgia requires
an examination of the development of the Georgia law relative to
actions on contracts by third party beneficiaries and of the use to
which the courts put Section 3-io8 in molding that law.

In Georgia,"2 as well as in other jurisdictions, 3 the right of a third
party beneficiary to maintain an action on the contract has been a
source of considerable litigation. 4 For almost a hundred years, the
Georgia jurisprudence on this phase of the law was characterized by
confusion, vacillation, and, in many instances, obvious injustice. Act
122 unquestionably was designed to eliminate this confusion and injustice.
88. Serrer v. Cigarette Service Co., 74 N. E. 2d 841, 848 (Ohio Ct. of Common Pleas 1946), af'd,
Serrer v. Cigarette Service Co., 74 N. E. 2d 853 (Ohio App. 1947), aff'd, Serrer v. Cigarette
Service Co., 76 N. E. 2d 91 (1947): "Where the Legislature concludes that competition in a
particular business requires regulation in the public interest, it may enact laws to prevent
threatened evils. The courts cannot set aside such legislation merely because of its limited application to one business."
89. Ga. L. 1949, p. 455.
90. GA. CODE sec. 8181 (1863).
91. GA. CODE see. 3192 (1868); GA. CODE sec. 3257 (1873); GA. CODE sec. 3257 (1882); GA. CODE sec.
4939 (1895); GA. CODE sec. 8516 (1910).

92. See 10 GA. B. J. 369, 370 (1948).
93. 2 WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 1030-1031, sec.347 (Rev. ed. 1936).
94. A number of states have resorted to legislation to solve the problem. 2 id. at 1066, sec. 365. The
statute most widely adopted provides:
"A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by
him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it."IDAHO CODE sec. 29-102
(1947); 2 WILLISTON, Op. cit. supra, note 93 at 1066, sec.365.
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Even before Section 3-io8 became a part of the law of Georgia,
the Supreme Court of Georgia, relying on Story's Equity Jurisprudence, laid down the rule that a third person "who is a mere stranger
to the consideration" could not enforce a covenant made for his benefit,95 and subsequently, without mentioning that rule, handed down
decisions inconsistent with its unqualified application. For many
years after Section 3-IO8 was incorporated into the Code, Georgia
courts decided third party beneficiary cases without relying on, or,
Not until 1903 did the Georgia
for that matter, even mentioning it."
courts resort to that section to support their denial of the right of a
third party to bring an action. 8 By that time most American jurisdictions had recognized a third party beneficiary's right to sue, and the
text writers were almost unanimous in supporting that right. Apparently fearing that Georgia courts would follow the .lead of courts
in other states, lawyers representing promisors in beneficiary cases
seized upon Section 3-1o8 and convinced Georgia courts that it codified the rule against suits by beneficiaries and that therefore the
courts were not free to depart from that rule." Actually, the wording of Section 3-io8 was so general and indefinite that the courts,
it is believed, easily could have held that section to be inapplicable
to actions by third party beneficiaries.' The opening words of that
section-"As a general rule"-indicated that exceptions to the rule
existed; all actions by third'party beneficiaries could have been classified as an exception;..' or third party beneficiaries could have been
held to be among the parties "in whom the legal interest in such contract is vested," so as to bring beneficiaries within the group having
capacity to maintain an action. The Georgia courts, however, chose
to interpret the section so as to bar suits by beneficiaries.
The argument was made to Georgia courts from time to time that
the rule barring suits by beneficiaries was inconsistent with another
section of the Georgia Code (numbered 20-3o6 in the present Code),
which states:
"If there be a valid consideration for the promise, it matters
not from whom it moves; the promisee may sustain his action,
though a stranger to the consideration."
This section, like Section 3-1o8, has appeared in every Georgia Code
95. Sterling v. Sterling, 12 Ga. 201, 204 (1852).
96. Bell v. MeGrady 32 Ga. 257 (1861); Dallas v. Heard, 32 Ga. 604 (1861).
97. See, e.g.. Austell v. Humphries, 99 Ga. 408. 27 S. E. 736 (1896); Gunter v. Mooney, 72 Ga. 205
(1883); Empire State Insurance Co. v. Collins, 54 Ga. 376 (1875).
98. See Hawkins v. Central of Georgia Ry., 119 Ga. 159, 165-166, 46 .3. E. 82, 85 (1903).
99. "We are, however, relieved from deciding between these divergent authorities, in view of the
common-law principle as codified in the Civil Code." ibid.
100. "The common provision in the so-called code states, that actions shall be brought in the name
of the real party in interest, though sometimes referred to as controlling the question (right
of beneficiary to sue), seems properly to have little bearing upon it." 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. upra,
note 93 at 1069, sec. 366.
101. See language in Sheppard v. Bridges, 137 Ga. 615, 630, 74 S. E. 245. 252 (1912).
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since 1863.1l 2 The Georgia courts generally have held the rule barring actions by third party beneficiaries not to be affected by Section
20-3o6, since a third party beneficiary is not a "promisee.""' 3 In
Carruth v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,"4 however, Section 20-3o6
(then numbered 4249) was utilized to permit a third party beneficiary
to sue to recover the benefits of an insurance policy. The opinion in that
case did not mention Section 3-108.
The application of the rule denying the right of third party beneficiaries to bring a suit to recover on the contract often resulted in
injustice; frequently the practical consequence of applying the rule
was to permit the promisor to avoid performance altogether.
Naturally, the courts in certain cases found ways to circumvent the
rule, and eventually they recognized numerous vaguely defined exceptions to it. The disregard of Section 3-108 in Carruth v. Aetna Life
Insurance Co."' already has been mentioned. Another method utilized
by a Georgia court in at least one instance to evade the rule was to
find the third party beneficiary to be an undisclosed principal of the
promisee and therefore a party to the contract.'
In a leading case decided in 1912, Sheppard v. Bridges,"' the Georgia Supreme Court recognized the firmly established rule that creditors
of a vendor could not sue at law a vendee who by the contract of sale
undertook to pay the vendor's debts, but nevertheless held that they
could protect themselves "by equitable proceedings and with proper
parties." ' By the requirement that the proceedings be "with proper
parties," the court apparently meant that the promisee as well as the
promisor had to be made a party to the suit. Later Georgia cases,
on the other hand, swinging away from the approach taken in the
Sheppard case, made clear that the rule against suits by third party
beneficiaries applied, generally at least, to equitable proceedings as
well as to suits at law. About 1920 the Georgia courts seem to have
come to the conclusion that Section 3-1o8 was a codification of the
English rule barring suits by third party beneficiaries and that, since
in England the rule was followed both in law and in equity, the Georgia rule also should be applied in both." 9 Yet, within a short time,
(1863); GA. CODE sec. 2705 (1068); GA. CODE sec. 2747 (1873); GA. CODE
sec. 2747 (1882); GA. CODEsec.
3664 (1895); GA. CODEsec. 4249 (1910).
103. Waxelbaum v. Waxelbaum, 54 Ga. App. 823, 189 S. E. 283 (1936); Cf. Sheppard v. Bridges,
102. GA. CODE see. 2711

137 Ga. 615, 630, 74 S. E. 245, 252 (1912); Hawkins v. Central of Georgia Ry., 119 Ga. 159, 46
S. E. 82 (1903); Gunter v. Mooney, 72 Ga. 205 (1883).

104. 157 Ga. 608, 112 S. E. 226 (1924).
105. ibid.

106. See Seifert v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 129 Ga. 181, 58 S. E. 699 (1907).
107. 137 Ga. 615, 74 S. E. 245 (1912).

In the Sheppard case, a partner retired from a firm and the

survivors and another person formed a new firm which purchased the interest of the retiring
partner and undertook to pay the debts of the old firm. The court permitted a creditor of the
old firm in an equitable proceeding, in which the retiring partner and the members were
parties, to compel the new firm to pay the debt.
108. 137 Ga. at 630, 74 S. E. at 252; accord, Union Realty & Trust Co. v. Wright, 138 Ga. 703,
76 S. E. 35 (1912).
109. See Shropshire v. Rainey, 150 Ga. 566, 570, 575, 104 S. E. 414, 416-417 (1920).
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Georgia courts, subjected to constant pressure to recognize the rights
'of third party beneficiaries, departed from the English view; and in
1926 the Supreme Court of Georgia referred with approval to the
view that "if one person makes a promise to another for the benefit
of a third person, that third person may maintain in equity an action
on the promise.""' In spite of this all-inclusive language, the Georgia
Supreme Court in 1933 in an action in equity brought by a third
party beneficiary dismissed the petition solely on the ground that the
promise the beneficiary sought to enforce "was not based upon any
consideration flowing from the plaintiff.""'
In 1936, the Georgia Court of Appeals in JJaxelbaum v. Waxelbaum... attempted to enumerate the exceptional situations in which a
beneficiary could maintain in his own name an action on a contract
between other parties. The court indicated that a beneficiary might
maintain an action if (I) he was a party to the contract or privy to
it, or (2) the contract created a trust for his benefit, or (3) "his
relation or status [had been] changed." Three years later this statement of the exceptions to the general rule was adopted by the Georgia Supreme Court."3
The exceptions laid down in the Waxelbaum case were far from
a satisfactory or accurate restatement of the principles developed by
the Georgia jurisprudence. The first exception, that a party to the
contract or a party privy to it may maintain an action, seems meaningless. No question ever existed on the right of a party to a contract
to sue on it. Section 3-loS does not purport to deprive a party to the
contract of his right to sue. Further, the statement of the exception
was inexact in that the Georgia courts have never laid down a satisfactory test to determine who is "privy" to a contract.'
The second Waxelbaum exception, that a beneficiary may sue where
the contract creates a trust in his favor, was not stated in sufficiently
broad language. If that exception is to restate accurately the principles developed by the Georgia cases, the word "trust" in the exception must be expanded far beyond its ordinary meaning. By the
time of the Waxelbaum case, several Georgia cases had permitted
beneficiaries to sue even though they clearly did not come with exceptions (i) or (3) and even though the contract on which they
sought to maintain an action did not create a trust in the usual sense. 1
110. Reid v. Whisenant, 161 Ga. 603, 508. 131 S. E. 904, 907 (1926); ci. Peoples Bank of Calhoun v.
Harry L. Winter, Inc., 161 Ga. 898, 132 S. E. 422 (1926).

111. Ragan v. National City Bank of Rome, 177 Ga. 686, 690, 170 S. E. 889, 891 (1933).
112. 64 Ga. App. 823, 824-825, 189 S. E. 283, 284 (1936).

113. First National Bank & Trust Company in Macon v. Roberts, 187 Ga. 472, 1 S. E. 2d 12 (1939).
114. Vagueness and uncertainty in regard to who is "privy" t9 a contract, was manifested in WaxeL
baum v. Waxelbaum, 54 Ga. App. 823, 825, 189 S. E. 283 284 (1936). The beneficiary's blood
relationship to promisee apparently does not make beneficiary "privy" to contract. Ragan v.
National City Bank of Rome, 177 Ga. 686, 692, 170 S. E. 889, 892 (1933).

115. Bell v. McGrady, 32 Ga. 257 (1861); Dallas v. Heard. 32 Ga. 604 (1861). See discussion of these
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One Georgia case stated that the creation of "quasi trust," whatever
that may mean, was sufficient to confer a right to sue on the beneficiary." ' Perhaps the most extreme case in which a Georgia court
purported to apply the trust exception was JVeruki v. Burke,"' decided.
by the Supreme Court of Georgia in 1947. In that case, petitioner's;
grandmother promised petitioner's parents, in return for their moving into her home and caring for her, to devise her property to petitioner. The petition, alleging full performance of the contract by
petitioner's parents and the death of the grandmother, sought specific
performance of the contract. The court permitted petitioner to maintain an action on the theory that the property was being held in trust
for petitioner."'
The third exception, that a beneficiary may sue if his relation or
status is changed by the contract, apparently is meant to apply to a
single fact situation: a parent gives up a child to another person in
consideration of the latter's promise to adopt the child. The foster
parent takes the child and "virtually adopts" it by treating it in all
respects as his own child, yet neglects to effect a statutory adoption;
the Georgia courts in numerous cases have held that the child can
bring an action to enforce recognition of his equitable rights in property of the adoptive parents."'
Act 122, simple and definite as it seems on casual examination,
actually may not have settled definitely all questions concerning the
right of a person not a party to a contract to sue on it. In most jurisdictions, a third person who is not a party to the contract but who
will receive benefits from its performance is classed as a (i) donee
beneficiary, (2) creditor beneficiary, or (3) incidental benficiary."'
He is a donee beneficiary if the purpose of the promisee in obtaining
the promise is to make a gift to the beneficiary or to confer on him a
right against the promisor to some performance neither due nor asserted to be due from the promisee to the beneficiary. 2' He is a creditor beneficiary if there is no intention to make a gift and performance
of the promise will satisfy an actual or asserted duty of the promisee
to the beneficiary. A typical creditor beneficiary situation is created
when A promises B to pay C $oo which B owes C: C is the creditor
beneficiary. Finally, he is an incidental beneficiary if the benefits to
two cases in Sheppard v. Bridges, 137 Ga. 615, 630, 74 S. E. 245, 250 (1912).
116. "(Sheppard v. Bridges) held that, if a beneficiary of a contract, though not a party to it,.
stand in a quasi trust relation to its subject-matter, he may enforce his rights under it in a,
court of equity with proper parties." Crawford v. Wilson, 139 Ga. 654, 661, 78 S. E. 30, 33-34
(1913).
117. 202 Ga. 844, 44 S.E. 2d 906 (1947).
118. See criticism of Veruki v. Burke in 10 GA. B. J. 369-372 (1948).
119. Crawford v. Wilson, 139 Ga. 654, 78 S.E. 30 (1913); McWilliams v. Pair, 151 Ga. 168, 106 S. ._
96 (1921) and cases there cited.
120. For a discussion of the various classes of beneficiaries, see 2 WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON TUR
LAW OF CONTRACTS 1041-1042, sec. 356 (Rev. ed. 1936).
121. RESTATEMENT. CONTRACTS sec. 133 (1932).
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him are merely incidental to the performance of the contract. For
instance, if A contracts with B to build a large office building on B's
lot, C, the owner of a restaurant on adjoining property who will benefit through increased patronage if the building is completed, is an incidental beneficiary.
Unquestionably Act 122 authorizes a donee beneficiary to maintain
an action on the contract. The act gives that right to a "beneficiary
of a contract made between other parties for his benefit," and by
definition one is not a donee beneficiary unless the contract is made
for his benefit. An argument can be made that the act does not empower a creditor beneficiary to sue because in such a situation the
promisee is not bargaining to obtain a benefit for the so-called beneficiary but to obtain one for himself.'22 Prior to the contract, the
promisee i indebted to the beneficiary; the promisee's motive primarily is to secure his own advantage by a discharge of his obligation,
not to confer a benefit on his creditor. Act 122, however, will probably
be interpreted broadly to give a right of action to creditor beneficiaries
as well as to donee beneficiaries. The great weight of American authority recognizes a direct enforceable right, both at law and in equity,
in both a donee beneficiary and a creditor beneficiary." 3 Georgia courts,
in interpreting Act 122, in all likelihood will be influenced by the general acceptance in other jurisdictions of the rights of a creditor beneficiary. Georgia courts have decided numerous cases involving each of
these types of beneficiaries, but they have always referred indiscriminately to both as "third party beneficiaries." A convincing argument
can be made that the General Assembly did not intend to distinguish
between donee and creditor beneficiaries, but on the contrary intended
to give both the right to maintain suit. A contract is "for the benefit"
of a creditor beneficiary in the sense that both the promisor and the
promisee contemplate that a beneficial performance will be rendered to
him. As a matter of fact, prior to the enactment of Act I22 most of the
Georgia cases permitting a beneficiary to sue on the theory that a
trust had been created in his favor were cases involving creditor
beneficiaries. Unless the act is interpreted to give all creditor beneficiaries the right to maintain an action, the courts in cases involving
creditor beneficiaries in all probability will revert to their subtle distinctions and conflicting decisions.
Act 122 should not, and probably will not, be interpreted to empower an incidental beneficiary to maintain an action. Not everyone
122. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Maxwell, 89 F. 2d 988, 994 (C.C.A. 4th 1937), where the court
concluded that a West Virginia statute (W. VA. CODE sec. 5494 (1943) ) does not confer rights
on a creditor beneficiary but that under the common law of the state he could recover against
the promisor in a suit in equity.
123. 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra, note 120 at 1042, sec. 356.
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who would benefit by the performance of a promise should be permitted to maintain an action for its breach; the promisor's liability
would be much too broad. A person who is neither the promisee nor
the party to whom performance is to be rendered should not be able
to maintain an action even though he would benefit by the performance
of the contract. Further, the wording of Act 122 indicates that an
incidental beneficiary was not contemplated, for an incidental beneficiary cannot establish that the contract was "made . . . for his
benefit."
Courts in other jurisdictions often have had difficulty determining
whether certain beneficiaries are donee or creditor beneficiaries and
thus entitled to bring an action, or whether they are merely incidental
beneficiaries; Georgia courts probably will have the same trouble in
applying Act 122. In most jurisdictions, the courts lay downthe rule
that a person can sue on a promise if the contracting parties intended
that he receive a direct benefit from the promise.124 Perhaps a better
solution would be to permit the beneficiary to maintain an action if
the promisor has promised to render a performance directly to him or
for his benefit, but, on the other hand, not to allow him to maintain
an action if the benefit to him is indirect and flows from a performance
agreed to be rendered to or for the promisee.'
(4) Radio and Television Defamation
Act 26312 restricts the liability for defamation of visual or sound
radio broadcasting station and network owners, licensees and operators and their agents. They are liable for defamation published on a
visual or sound broadcast only when they fail to exercise due care to
prevent the publication.' Their liability even then is limited to "such
actual consequential, or punitive damages as have been alleged and
proved,' n12 ' and in no event does it extend to defamatory statements
uttered over the facilities of the station or network by or in behalf of
any candidate for public office. 2 9
Questions concerning the liability of radio stations for defamatory
remarks uttered by persons other than the stations' agents and pub.
lished through the facilities of the station have apparently never been
124. Baurer v. Devenis, 99 Conn. 203, 121 Atl. 566 (1923); Montgomery v. Spencer, 15 Utah 495, 50
Pac. 623 (1897). "The benefit which is referred to as giving a right of action by a beneficiary,
under the American rule, must not be an indirect or incidental one; but the contract, properly
construed, must exhibit an intent to confer a benefit on the third party." Sheppard v. Bridges,
137 Ga. 615, 622, 74 S. E. 245, 249 (1912).

125. See GRISMORE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 400, sec. 234

126.
127.
128.
129.

(1947).

"A promise shall

be construed to have been made for the benefit of a person whenever the promisor of said
promise has undertaken to give or to do or to refrain from doing something directly to or for
said person." Mich. Pub. Acts No. 296, sec. 2 (1937), MICH. COMP. LAWS sec. 691.531 (1948).
Ca. L. 1949, pp. 117-1138.
Sec. 1.
Sec. 3.
Sec. 2.
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treated by the appellate courts of Georgia. In enacting the above
statute, the General Assembly of Georgia has solved in advance
problems that have long troubled courts of other jurisdictions. These
problems, briefly, are (i) whether broadcast defamation is libel or
slander, and (2) whether the owner or operator of broadcasting
facilities by which 'defamation is published is strictly liable to the
person defamed or is liable only in the event of negligence in selecting the speaker or in failing to prevent the making of defamatory
statements.
The question of whether broadcasting defamatory statements is
libel or slander arises because proof of special damage is usually
necessary to support an action for slander."'0 In most of the decided
radio defamation cases this problem has not been of great importance,
since the defamation even if considered slanderous rather than libelous
was of the type that is actionable without proof of special damages.'
In the few cases considering the problem, different results have been
reached." 2 The statute under consideration, by requiring the plaintiff
to prove damages, places defamation by radio in the category of slander rather than libel.
In those jurisdictions where the problem of strict liability or liability
only for negligence has arisen, courts have been led to conflicting results by different views of the policy considerations involved. Earlier
cases imposed upon a station owner or operator the strict liability
imposed upon newspapers, basing their result on the analogy of radio
broadcasting to newspaper publishing. 3 Other courts in more recent
cases, however, have refused to impose liability on station owners in
the absence of negligence, seeing a real difference between newspapers
180. In Georgia, damage is inferred from slanderous statements which impute to the plaintiff a
crime punishable by law, charge him with affliction with a contagious disorder or guilt of a
debasing act "which may exclude him from society," or refer to and are calculated to injure him
in regard to his "trade, office, or profession." GA. CODE see. 105-702 (1933). In some jurisdictions there is added to this list the imputation of unchasity to a woman. See PRossE, HANDBOOX OF THE LAW OF TORTS p. 804 (1941); RESTATEMENT, TORTS, sees. 570, 574 (1938), whereas
this rule in Georgia is applicable when the plaintiff is a white woman and the charge is of
sexual intercourse "with a person of color." GA. CODE, see. 105-707 (1933).
131. See, e.g.. Kelly v. Hoffman, 61 A. 2d 143. 146 (N. J. L. 1948).
132. In Hlartmann v. Winchell, 296 N. Y. 2; ,, 72 N. E. 'd 30, 171 A.L.R. 759 (1947), it was expressly held that the broadcast of words read from a script was libel and not slander, where
the words were not actionable without proof of damages. See also Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb.
(address read from script: libel); Irwin v. Ashurst.
348, 243 N. W. 82, 82 A.L.R. 1098 (1932)
158 Or. 61, 74 P. 2d 1127 (1938)
(remarks made by an attorney in summing up in murder
trial broadcast from courtroom: assumed to be libel); Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash.
466, 20 P. 2d 847 (1933) (statements read from script: assumed to be slander). The American
Law Institute takes the view that when the speaker has "a prepared manuscript or speaks from
written or printed notes," the defamation is libel: whether extemporaneous broadcasts are libel
or slander depends upon "the area of dissemination, the deliberate and premeditated character
of its publication, and the persistence of the defamatory conduct." RESTATEMENT, TORTS, sec.
568 (3), and comments.
133. "The fundamental principles of law involved in publication by a newspaper and by a radio
station seem to be alike. There is no legal reason why one should be favored over another
nor why a broadcasting station should be granted special favors as against one who may be a
victim of a libelous publication." Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82, 86, 82 A.L.R.
1098 (1932). See also Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889, 890 (D. Mo. 1934);
Irwin v. Ashurst. 158 Or. 61, 74 P. 2d 1127, 1130 (1938); Miles v. Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash.
416, 20 F. 2d 847, 849 (1988).
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and radio stations. 3 ' The Georgia statute obviates any difficulty on
this score by expressly limiting liability to cases of failure to exercise
due care.135
The inclusion of the word "visual" in the statute indicates an intent
to make it applicable to television as well as radio broadcasts. The use
of the words "defamatory statement published or uttered," however,
raises some doubt as to whether the statute is designed to cover only
the spoken words transmitted in connection with a television broadcast, or whether its protection is extended to pictorial representations
defamatory by themselves and to those defamatory only when considered with accompanying spoken words.
The provision against holding liable the station owner or agent for
defamatory remarks made by or on behalf of candidate for public
office is a desirable one. There is obvious value in having speeches of
candidates broadcast. By Federal statute 3 ' radio licensees permitting
candidates for a public office to use their broadcasting stations must
afford equal opportunity to other candidates for that office, and yet
they have no power of censorship over the material so broadcast. In
view of this statute, it would be unjust to impose upon broadcasters
strict liability or even to allow recovery against them based upon
failure to exercise due care to prevent transmission of defamatory
statements.
134. "The physical aspects of radio broadcasting warrant a rule that if the management of a
radio station has used due care in the selection of the lessee and of its facilities and in the
inspection of the script, it should not be liable for extemporaneous remarks." Josephson v.
Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179 Misc. 787, 38 N.Y.S. 2d 985, 986 (1942); "Newspaper
defamations possess possibilities for real harm far greater than defamations by radio, as they
constitute permanent, continuing records, which through circulation, are constantly republished. The radio word is quickly spoken and, generally, as quickly forgotten." Summit Hotel
Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A. 2d 302, 310, 124 A.L.R. 968 (1939). See also
Kelly v. Hoffman, 61 A. 2d 143 (N. J. L. 1948) (liability of radio broadcasting company, lessor,
to be determined on the basis of a disseminator rather than a publisher).
135. The Legislature at this same session imposed a heavier burden upon newspapers by removing
the exemption from payment of other than actual damages upon notification by the person
defamed of the truth in the article and publication of correction or retraction and showing
that the publication was due to an honest mistake based upon reasonable grounds. GA. CODE
ANN. secs. 105-712, 105-713 (Ga. L. 1939, p. 343), repealed, Ga. L. 1949, p. 915.
136. 48 STAT. 1088, sec. 315 (1934), 47 U.S.C.A. sec. 315 (Supp. 1948).

